On 29 July, John J Mearsheimer described the US war with Iran as The Disaster that Keeps on Giving. This observation is in the context of Iran’s growing strength. The economic, political and military realities in the region are in sharp contrast to Trump’s claims of US dominance.
Trump’s military posture
Paul Krugman, writing on 28 July, described The Putinization of the American Military:
“Pete Hegseth and Donald Trump began with an astonishingly stupid theory of war: the belief that performative masculinity is how you win. Hegseth literally believes that the secret of military might in an age of AI-enabled drones that can travel hundreds of miles is more testosterone.”
“Trump is backing down because military professionals have finally managed to convince him that U.S. stocks of advanced munitions are so severely depleted that the current rate of use will soon leave America critically weakened.” Patriot interceptors are in especially short supply.
The US and its allies are vulnerable
Iran attacks American allies and American bases in the region, in response to Trump’s bombing tactics. It can easily inflict pain on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan for example. Oil infrastructure and water treatment facilities are especially vulnerable. And America is forced to use expensive Patriot interceptors to protect its bases.
Iran’s support network
Iran isn’t fighting alone. China buys its oil, supplies it with components to make drones and missiles, and has recently sold it weapons. Russia is sharing valuable electronic intel with Iran, helping it to attack American bases. And Iran supplies the Houthis in Yemen with weaponry for them to attack targets in the region – including Saudi oil exports through the Red Sea.
Iran benefits from a protracted war
The BBC has reported on Why limited war with the US may suit Iran better than peace:
“Even limited uncertainty forces governments, shipowners and importers to pay attention to Iran’s demands.”
“From Tehran’s perspective, keeping the crisis alive below the threshold of total war may therefore be preferable to accepting a ceasefire that leaves sanctions, the blockade and economic isolation largely unchanged.”
“There may also be domestic calculations. Iran …[could] suppress internal opposition, justify tighter security measures and rally support around national defence.”
The US position is steadily worsening
High fuel prices, as the mid-term elections approach, put political pressure on Trump. As Mearsheimer noted: Trump “was foolish not to take advantage of the first cease fire on 8 April 2026 and work to end the war then. He surely could have gotten a better deal by that point than the one he ultimately got on 17 June 2026. The fact is that Iran’s bargaining leverage only grows with time. Plus, the Iranians get more and more evidence that Trump cannot be trusted to stick to a deal.”
It is abundantly clear that the US needs a swift exit from the Iran war, but it is unclear how it can do that